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"DON'T LET THE SUN GO DOWN ON ME:'
AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT OPPORTUNISTIC
BUSINESS METHOD PATENT LICENSING
AND A PROPOSED SOLUTION TO ALLOW
SMALL-DEFENDANT BUSINESS METHOD
USERS TO SING A HAPPIER TUNE
ANDREA LYNN EVENSEN*

Some say eat or be eaten
Some say live and let live
But all are agreed as they join the stampede
You should never take more than you give.2

INTRODUCTION

You own a small family business where you sell curios and
other trinkets to the local townspeople. Your business has been
doing well despite the small customer base. Finally, you decide to
hire a web-programming firm to take your business online.3 All is
going swell until the unexpected happens. You receive a letter
from Mammoth Company,' which states that you are infringing its
business method patent claiming how to sell items online.5 You
Associate at Brinks, Hofer, Gilson & Lione. The author
dedicates this
Comment to the loving memory of her mother, Vanessa Johnson, whose
constant friendship, love and support will never be forgotten. The author also
gives special thanks to James Katz, Associate at Brinks, Hofer, Gilson &
Lione, for bringing this topic to her attention and to Professor Doris Long,
Leanne Conn and Michael Evensen for their suggestions and feedback.
1. Elton John, Don't Let the Sun Go Down on Me, on CARIBOU (Polygram
Records 1996).
2. Elton John, Circle of Life, on THE LION KING: ORIGINAL MOTION
PICTURE SOUNDTRACK (Disney Records 1994).
3. See Rafat Ali, CR.org Rates with Paying Public, FOLIO: THE MAG. FOR
MAG. MGMT., Sept. 1, 2002, at 37 (discussing the value in having a content
website and the large amount of revenue that can be generated from it).
4. The name "Mammoth Company" is a fictitious name and is in no way
meant to resemble any company, person or entity bearing such a name, or one
similar thereto.
5. See Marshall Krantz, A Patently Absurd Premise? Company Tries to
Patent Online Meetings Management, Processes, Demands Royalties, MEETING
NEWS, Aug. 5, 2002 (discussing the absurdity in a company attempting to
patent that which is already used and that which is overbroad), 2002 WL
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are left with two choices: 1) pay the $10,000 licensing fee' that it
requests or 2) fight it out in court.' You choose the latter and then
go broke trying to pay the $800,000 in discovery costs before you
even get to a trial.8
Your neighboring businesses listen to you sing a sad song,
while you close your shutters and shut down your website. Then
the inevitable happens: they, too, start receiving similar letters
from Mammoth, which allege infringement of its business method
patent. Hoping not to experience the same peril as you, they
choose to pay the licensing fee, despite their gut feeling that the
business method patent just does not seem right.9
Besides sending letters to more small online retailers,
Mammoth also posts to its website a list of those that paid the
licensing fee. It alleges that it is legally entitled to the fees;

25808254; Mark Del Franco, Divine Intervention, CATALOG AGE, Jan. 1, 2003
(addressing how one company in Chicago, Illinois is attempting to patent web
commerce and that it will force those that use its invention to choose between
being sued or paying a licensing fee), 2003 WL 6931601.
6. See John Soat, Patent Troubles Pending: Small Companies Say They're
Being Sued for Employing Common Practicesfor Doing Business on the Net,
INFORMATIONWEEK, Oct. 21, 2002, at 20 (discussing how one large company
has sued many small defendants and asked for a patent licensing fee of
$30,000), 2002 WL 8145130.
7. See Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Computer Law: Pre-FilingIssues
in Enforcing Software/Business Method Patents, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 10, 2002, at 3
col. 1 (explaining that because of the "explosion of 'business method' patent
litigation" many plaintiffs will send defendants cease-and-desist letters and
will force them to make the choice between litigating the matter and simply
paying a licensing fee); David V. Radack, How to Handle Cease-and-Desist
Letters, JOM, Sept. 1, 2003, at 72 (noting how a defendant should handle a
cease-and-desist letter), 2003 WL 11980193.
8. See Samson Vermont, The Economics of Patent Litigation, in FROM
IDEAS TO ASSETS: INVESTING WISELY IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 327, 328

(Bruce Berman ed., 2002) (reasoning that because of the high cost of patent
suits, many of those involved in patent suits would rather settle than incur the
costs necessary to fight the litigation); Richard P. Beem, Winning Patent
Fights Without Spending a Bundle, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Aug. 26, 2003, at 6
(noting the high cost of patent litigation: "[i]n the year 2000, patent
infringement litigation in a mid-range case cost an average of $797,000
through discovery, or $1,499,000 through trial"); Kaare Larson, Worried About
Costly Patent Litigation?Alternatives for Invalidating a Competitor's Patent,
ORANGE COUNTY BUS. J., Mar. 24, 2003, at 21 (discussing the high cost of
litigating a patent trial due to the "the everchanging patent laws and the legal
and technical issues that are sometimes incredibly subtle"), 2003 WL
11294453; Barry A. Cooper, Intellectual Property Primer,CPA J., May 1, 2002,
at 4047-48 (stating that "[e]nforcing a patent against an infringer through
litigation is expensive and time-consuming"), 2002 WL 14217291; Michael Ann
Knotts, ProtectingThat Intellectual Property:IP Firms Thrive as Patent Value
Climbs in Bad Times, 12 N.J. LAW.: THE WKLY. NEWSPAPER, Feb. 3, 2003 at 3,
col. 1 (explaining the high cost of patent litigation).
9. See Soat, supra note 6 (stating that many defendants would rather pay
a licensing fee than incur the high costs of litigation).
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otherwise why would so many have paid it? Mammoth encourages
other small online retailers to pay the licensing fee too, or face a
similar end as did you.
Mammoth rejoices as, slowly but surely, the licensing checks
start pouring in. It was right; only a fool would choose to pay the
$1,000,000 in legal fees to fight it out in court,"0 rather than just
pay a few thousand for a licensing fee.
Opportunistic patent licensing, the use of invalid patents to
secure licensing fees, is occurring more and more today" because
of the rise of business method patents. 2 This is despite the fact
that many of these patents might not stand up to a validity
challenge in court. 3 However, because of the high cost of litigating
a patent dispute, 4 many small defendants are forced to settle by
paying a licensing fee." Something must change."
This Comment will address the problem of opportunistic
business method patent licensing and will propose a solution. Part
I will give the reader a background regarding business method
patents and the problems that they pose. Part II will give the

10. See Vermont, supra note 8, at 327-28, 334 n.76 (discussing the average
total cost of patent litigation). See also Jon Van, Small Online Retailers
Targeted, SEATTLE TiMEs, Feb. 8, 2003, at A3 [hereinafter Van, Small Online
Retailers Targeted] (indicating that retailers would rather settle than incur
the high cost to litigate a patent dispute), 2003 WL 3620353.
11. See Scott Thrum, The Ultimate Weapon: It's the Patent and Critics Say
It Threatens to Undermine the Very Nature of the Internet, ASIAN WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 24, 2000, at T1l (noting the use of business method patents in order to
gain licensing fees), 2000 WL-WSJA 23744904; Vermont, supra note 8, at 330
(stating that "[1licensing revenues have risen even faster than patent filings");
Robert C. Scheinfeld & Jeffrey D. Sullivan, Internet-RelatedPatents:Are They
Paying Off?, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 10, 2002, at 5 col. 1 (explaining that "[alt least
some plaintiffs, more diligent or strategic in their acquisition and assertion of
such [business method] patents, have deployed them to dramatic effect against
a number of companies doing business over the Internet or in other computerrelated fields").
12. See Scheinfeld & Sullivan, supra note 11 (discussing the increase in
business method patents filed).
13. See Thrum, supra note 11 (explaining the problems with business
method patents); Wes Jones, Amazon Patent - Business Method or Business
Muddle?, INDEP. Bus. WKLY., July 16, 2003 (discussing how many business
method patents are overbroad and invalid), 2003 WL 60646553.
14. See Van, Small Online Retailers Targeted, supra note 10 (stating that
"[iun the United States it is difficult and expensive to overturn a patent in
court"); Vermont, supra note 8, at 328 (stating that "[sleventy-six percent of
patent suits settle, but not before each side incurs more than $1 million in
direct legal fees and indirect expenses").
15. See Vermont, supra note 8, at 328 (discussing how many parties to
patent litigation may feel compelled to settle due to the inordinate cost of such
lawsuits).
16. See id. at 329 (describing how patents are more important today than
they were in the past "because the confluence of the Internet, global venture
capital and cultural changes have eroded other traditional barriers to entry").
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reader a better understanding of the hypothetical discussed in the
introduction and a realization that this scenario is exacerbated
due to the advent of the Internet. Part III will discuss why the
current protections for small defendants do not work. Finally,
Part IV will propose a solution to address the issue of
opportunistic business method patent licensing.
I.

A BACKGROUND ON BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS
I got a problem I can't explain
It's hard to solve it, I can't lose face
17
They all try to help me, but I can't see the light.

To better understand the problem with opportunistic business
method patent licensing, it is important to understand from where
the problem stems. Thus, subsection A will discuss the history of
business method patents, and subsection B will give some
statistics relating to business method patents. Subsection C will
discuss the problems that business method patents pose.
A. The History of Business Method Patents
The history of patents is rather long. 8 Despite the lengthy
17. Neil Young, I Got a Problem, on LANDING ON WATER (Geffen Special
Prod. 1996).
18. See Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, The Elusive Logic of Standing
Doctrine in Intellectual Property Law, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1323, 1336-37 (2000)
(discoursing on the long history of patent law). The ability to protect
inventions stems from the Constitution's grant to Congress "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.... ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Congress exercised this power
under title 35 of the United States Code. Although all of chapter 35 is
important, there are three sections that are particularly important, especially
when it comes to evaluating business method patents: § 101, § 102, and § 103.
Section 101 states that the invention must be patentable subject matter. 35
U.S.C. § 101 (2000). The statute states that patentable subject matter is "any
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvement thereof ... ." 35 U.S.C. § 101.
A
mathematical algorithm, law of nature, or a scientific truth are not patentable
subject matter. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187-88 (1981). Section 102
states the novelty requirement for patentability. 35 U.S.C. § 102.
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or
patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign
country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in
this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more
than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the
United States, or
(c) he has abandoned the invention, or
(d) the invention was first patented or caused to be patented, or was the
subject of an inventor's certificate, by the applicant or his legal
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history of patents in general, the history of business method
patents is very short. 9 This is because business method patents
were viewed as exceptions to patentable subject matter up until
1998.20 In that year, the State Street Bank2 decision stated that
business methods were no longer exceptions to that which may be
patented. 2
To be patentable as a business method patent, 3 a business
representatives or assigns in a foreign country prior to the date of the
application for patent in this country on an application for patent or
inventor's certificate filed more than twelve months before the filing of
the application in the United States...
Id. Section 103 states that a condition for patentability is that the invention
must be non-obvious subject matter. Id. § 103.
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically
disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the
prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary
skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall
not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.
Id. § 103(a).
19. Ann Marie Rizzo, The Aftermath of State Street Bank & Trust v.
Signature Financial Group: Effects of United States Electronic Commerce
Business Method Patentabilityon InternationalLegal and Economic Systems,
50 DEPAuL L. REV. 313, 316-17 (2000) (discussing the history of business
method patents).
20. See, e.g., Hotel Sec. Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467, 469, 47172 (2d Cir. 1908) (holding that business method patents are non-patentable
subject matter because they are merely techniques and thus lack the required
novelty to be patentable inventions).
21. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d
1368, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
22. In 1998, the Federal Circuit in State Street Bank held that business
method patents are not to be excluded as patentable subject matter under
§ 101. Id. at 1377. "The business method exception has merely represented
the application of some general, but no longer applicable legal principle...
business methods have been, and should have been, subject to the same legal
requirements for patentability as applied to any other process or method." Id.
at 1375. Accord AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352,
1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that a business method patent can sustain a
patent infringement claim); Larry A. DiMatteo, The New "Problem" of
Business Method Patents: The Convergence of National Patent Laws and
InternationalInternet Transaction,28 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 1721 (2002) (evaluating the State Street Bank decision).
23. The United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO" or "PTO")
"classifies business method patents under MC Class 705 in the U.S. Patent
Classification System (USPCS)." DiMatteo, supra note 22, at 20 (citing the
Patent
Classification
Homepage,
which
can
be
accessed
at
http://www.uspto.gov/go/classification/uspc705/sched705.htm (last visited July
8, 2004)). The patents under this classification "reflect the implementing or
enabling engineering... used to carry out the practical application being
claimed." Id. at 21. See Paul Devinsky, CraftingMeaningful Business Method
Patents, MONDAQ BUS. BRIEFING, Jun. 3, 2003, at 1 (explaining what business
method patents are: "[a] business method patent is no more than an ordinary
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method must "result in a useful, concrete and tangible result."24
To accomplish this, "the new business method [may need to show
that it] decreases operating costs,... increases productivity, or...
achieves some other tangible economic benefit.""
B. Business Method Patent Statistics
Ever since the State Street Bank holding and the post-dot-com
world, 6 the amount of business method patent applications filed
has "flood[ed]" the United States Patent and Trademark Office
("USPTO" or "PTO"). 27 "Only 170 applications for business method
patents were filed in fiscal year 1995. By 1999, the number of
business method patent applications received and granted by the
PTO had increased to 2,700 and 583, respectively; and to 7,900
and 899 in 2000. "28 The "biggest surges" in 2001 came from
internet and telecommunications technologies.' Many critics feel
'method' patent, whose subject happens to be business. Nevertheless, business
method patents are still considered sufficiently unique..."), 2003 WL
57495383.
24. State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1373.
25. Rizzo, supra note 19, at 340.
26. Erika Jonietz, Economic Bust Patent Boom: What Recession? The
Recent PatentFrenzy Shows No Sign of Abating, TECH. REV., May 1, 2002, at
71, 2002 WL 8834967.
27. John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, Internet Business Method Patents,
TEX. Bus. REV., Oct. 1, 2002, at 1, 2002 WL 22446419. See Gerald H. Kiel &
Harry K. Ahn, "Business Methods" are Broadly Defined: Patent Protection Is
Available in Variety of Areas Including Marketing, Sales and Finance, N.Y.
L.J., Feb. 3, 2003, at S9 col. 1 (reasoning that the State Street Bank and AT&T
Corp. decisions have "opened a floodgate for companies to seek patent
protection for new business methods"); Karen Rodriguez, Dot-Corns Scramble
for Patent Protection in Record Numbers, BUS. J., Sept. 8, 2000, at 9 (stating
that "W[the pace of applications for Internet business patents has surged since
1998, the same year the federal appeals court opened the flood gate to patent
protection by clearing a misunderstood exception to the patent law around socalled business methods"), 2000 WL 26139882; Troy Wolverton, Patent
Lawsuit Could Sting eBay, at http./news.com.coi/2100-1017-956638.html
(Sep. 5, 2002) (stating that "[platent registration-and subsequent lawsuitshave ballooned since 1998, when the courts ruled that business processes
could be patented").
28. Allison & Tiller, supra note 27. The number of patent applications
generally has also risen. See Keith Benman, Businesses in Munster, Ind.,
Region Join Patent Rush, TIMES, MUNSTER IND., Jan. 4, 2003 (noting that
quantities of "patent applications filed each year with the Patent Office has
more than doubled during the last decade, going from 177,830 applications
filed in 1991 to 345,732 filed in 2001, according to Patent and Trademark
Office statistics. Patents issued increased from 106,698 in 1991 to 183,975 in
2001"), 2003 WL 4552161. The number of patent examiners has also risen
dramatically. Id. ("The office's staff of patent examiners has increased from
2,100 in 1998 to approximately 3,600 today.").
29. Jonietz, supra note 26, at 71.
Semiconductor companies saw an average increase of 21.4 percent in the
number of patents issued from 2000 to 2001. Similarly, patenting grew
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that the business method patent application boom will continue to
grow "as the economy stagnates and companies seek new revenue
streams."'
C. The Problems that Business Method PatentsPose
There are many critics of business method patents.' Their
complaints are found in three basic areas: 1) business method
patents are overbroad"3 because 2) the prior art searches are too
difficult to successfully complete,33 which leads to 3) a high error
rate.34
These problems, as well as others, have led some critics to call
for business method patents to be removed from the realm of
patentable subject matter.
The author has no interest in

20.4 percent in the telecom industry, and in computing 11.6 percent.
Even more impressive, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office statistics
suggest the penchant for patents amount information technology
companies will continue; these three sectors saw the highest numbers of
new patent applications filed in 2000 ....
Id. See also Bill Roberts, The Truth About Patents, INTERNET WORLD, Apr. 15,
2000, at 72, (discussing patents statistics), 2000 WL 11672761.
30. See Scheinfeld & Sullivan, supra note 11 (stating that because of the
economy "aggressive patentees can be expected to search more aggressively for
previously untapped assets, including patents whose potential applicability to
widely used business methods might have gone unnoticed in the past");
Vermont, supra note 8, at 330 (explaining that there is no reason to expect the
increase in patent application filing to stop).
31. See Jeffrey R. Kuester & Lawrence E. Thompson, Risks Associated with
Restricting Business Method and E-Commerce Patents, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
657, 657 (2001) (reasoning that "[blusiness method patents have taken a
severe beating since the Federal Circuit decided State Street Bank & Trust Co.
v. Signature FinancialGroup, Inc. in July of 1998"); Wolverton, supra note 27
(stating that "[ciritics say many patented business methods are obvious and
that enforcement would hinder the growth of the Internet of e-commerce").
32. See DiMatteo, supra note 22, at 25 (discussing the criticisms of business
method patents for their overbreadth).
33. See Jacob Razem, Patent Protection for New Ways to Do Business and
the Effect on FinancialInstitutions, 4 N.C. BANKING INST. 521, 542-43 (2000)
(discussing the difficulty of doing a prior art search for a business method
patent); Paul F. Fehlner & Paul M. Zagar, Protecting Secret Methods: The
First Inventor Defense Could Provide a Shield for Some Biotech Processes,
NAT'L. L.J., Dec. 16, 2002, at C4 col. 4 (stating that "[aiccused infringers of
business method patents issued.., are... at a significant disadvantage
because of a dearth of business-method prior art available to attack the
patents").
34. See Robert P. Merges, As Many As Six Impossible Patents Before
Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform,
14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 590-91 (1999) (explaining the high error rate of
business method patents).
35. See Allison & Tiller, supra note 27 (stating that the "increas[ing]
number of Internet business method patents applied for and received concerns
many critics of the patent system, who argue that granting Internet business
method patents is bad for innovation, making it more difficult for the diffusion
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debating in this comment whether the State Street Bank decision
should be overturned so that business method patents may be laid
to rest. However, in order to understand the problem of
opportunistic business method patent licensing, it is important to
understand the difficulties these patents pose.
Because business method patents are non-technical in nature,
they tend to be over-inclusive. 6
Specifically, e-commerce
"inventions" protected by business method patents "merely apply
long-standing business techniques to the Internet."" Thus, these
business method patents are granted to protect "broad concepts"
rather than actual innovation.'
Another reason why so many overbroad business method
patents are granted is because the patent office lacks the prior art
resources to investigate whether the process is actually novel.39
The lack of prior art is due to the fact that most business methods
remained as trade secrets or were not written about at all prior to
the State Street Bank decision.' Thus, to do a sufficient prior art
search, patent examiners cannot go to their traditional prior art
databases" or look to granted patents." Instead, examiners need
to search "in private collections of industry memorabilia," which
makes the likelihood of finding the prior art very difficult.'
Overbroad business method patents are granted due to the
great difficultly in finding the prior art that most likely does

of ideas and entrepreneurial activity often associated with the Internet"); Leo
J. Raskind, The State Street Bank Decision: The Bad Business of Unlimited
Patent Protection for Methods of Doing Business, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 61, 61-67 (1999) (discussing the many problems with the
State Street Bank decision).
36. See DiMatteo, supra note 22, at 25 (explaining how the business method
patent tends to be overbroad due to its non-technical nature).
37. Rizzo, supra note 19, at 363.
38. See id. (reasoning that because business method patents are nontechnical, they tend to patent "broad concepts" rather than a concrete science).
39. See id. at 363-64 (discussing of what prior art the PTO is aware is
important as to whether or not it decides to issue the patent; so, when there is
a poor prior art database the patent is more likely to be issued even though
the invention is not truly novel).
40. See Andre J. Porter, Should Business Method Patents Continue to Be
Patentable?,29 S.U. L. REV. 225, 242 (2002) (noting how prior art databases of
information pertaining to that which business methods are now patented were
traditionally not kept by the USPTO).
41. See Kuester & Thompson, supra note 31, at 668 (stating that "[olne of
the main problems with the current system for examination of business
method patents is the state of the prior art databases").
42. See Razem, supra note 33, at 541 (explaining how patent examiners are
not usually able to gain any prior art relating to business methods by
reviewing patents already issued because business method patents are so
new).
43. See id. (noting that it is very difficult for a patent examiner to find prior
art because they need to search outside their prior art databases).
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exist." Thus, there are a growing number of business method
patents that are of "extremely poor quality" being issued, despite
the fact that they do not meet the requirements of non-obviousness
and novelty.'
These concerns about the quality of business
method patents being issued lead some commentators to draw the
conclusion that "the patent system is in crisis.
II.

BACKGROUND REGARDING THE HYPOTHETICAL

I got some ocean front property in
From my front porch you can see
I got some ocean front property in
If you'll buy that, I'll throw the golden

Arizona.
the sea.
Arizona.
gate in free."

Today, business method patents are an important
consideration for internet business, 9 since they can and are being
used as weapons to gain licensing fees.59 By stating this, the
author in no way intends to allege that licensing patented
inventions for use is necessarily a bad thing. Quite the contrary,
this is obviously one of the many benefits to having a limited-time
monopoly over the invention.5' However, there is clear injustice
when an entity uses its business method patent, which is
overbroad and would not stand up to a validity challenge,52 to force
other entities, that are unable to financially afford to make a
Because of the
validity challenge,' to pay licensing fees.'
44. See Merges, supra note 34, at 589-90 (stating that "[ilt therefore seems
likely that many of the [business method] patents being issued in this area
(software patents) overlook highly relevant prior art"); Roberts, supra note 29
(explaining that "[o]ne problem [with business method patents] is that the
non-patented research isn't easy to dig up. 'You have to go through back
volumes of stuff page by page to find it" (quoting Greg Aharonian)).
45. Merges, supra note 34, at 589.
46. See DiMatteo, supra note 22, at 23 (stating that "[t]he open recognition
of business method patents and their Internet application have resulted in the
issuance of a growing number of'bad patents'). Bad patents can be defined as
"patents granted for alleged inventions that do not meet the requirements of
novelty or non-obviousness." Id.
47. See Merges, supra note 34, at 591 (concluding that "[tihe concerns about
quality, especially in light of the data on overall volume, point to one
conclusion: the patent system is in crisis").
48. George Strait, Ocean Front Property,on OCEAN FRONT PROPERTY (MCA
Records 1990).
49. See Rizzo, supra note 19, at 315 (noting how important business method
patents are for today's companies).
50. See Vermont, supra note 8, at 330 (discussing the recent increase in
patent licensing revenues).
51. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (giving Congress the ability to award a
limited time monopoly over inventions).
52. See Rizzo, supra note 19, at 363-64 (reasoning that because many
business method patents are overbroad, they would probably not withstand a
validity challenge in court).
53. See Allison & Tiller, supra note 27, at 1 (stating that "[iun addition to
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shortcomings of the business method patent, opportunistic
business method patent licensing ensues."
Subsection A will discuss opportunistic business method
patent litigation and licensing and subsection B will state how this
causes the public to bear the burden of bad patents. Subsection C
will discuss the new weapons that plaintiffs and defendants are
using with regards to opportunistic business method patent
licensing.
A.

OpportunisticBusiness Method Patent Litigation and
Licensing

Strike suits exist in litigation." Strike suits are "when a
plaintiff, often in a securities case, raises a baseless claim of fraud
to win a settlement. Plaintiffs file baseless claims with the hope of
' 7
'exacting quick and extortionate settlements.""
Thus, a strike
suit, referred to here as opportunistic litigation, is "[a]ny litigation
prosecuted with some motive other than a good faith expectation of
success on the merits."58
Although opportunistic litigation is usually seen in securities
cases, the definition can be extended to patent cases as well. 9
Thus, a patentee sues a defendant alleging infringement of its
business method patent in order to gain licensing revenue,
knowing it is overbroad and would fail in a validity test.
Because of the "flood"' of business method patents being
granted, the number of opportunistic suits has also increased.6
[patent] protection, many firms and individuals have acquired such [business
method] patents for profitable licensing opportunities, regardless of whether
they intend to employ these business operations").
54. See Vermont, supra note 8, at 327-30 (discussing how the extreme costs
of patent litigation may compel parties to settle and pay licensing fees).
55. See Jon Van, E-Commerce Patent Threat; Firms Claim Broad Coverage,
Then Sue; Targets Often Pay To Avoid Fight, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 13, 2003, at 1
[hereinafter Van, E-Commerce Patent Threat Firms] (discussing the problems
with business method patents and how that leads to opportunistic patent
licensing), 2003 WL 3743244.
56. See Michael A. Weidinger, Inequitable Pleading:Defendants' Particular
Burden in Patent Infringement Suits, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1178, 1202-03
(1994) (explaining strike suits).
57. Id. at 1202 (quoting William M. Richman et al., The Pleadingof Fraud:
Rhymes Without Reason, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 959, 982 (1987)).
58. Richman et al., supra note 57, at 963.
59. See Weidinger, supra note 56, at 1202-03 (discussing how opportunistic
litigation is generally seen in securities cases, and how it arises in patent
litigation).
60. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing the proliferation
of business method patents in recent years).
61. See Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunisticand Anti-Competitive
Intellectual Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 517 (2003) (stating that
"[t]he explosion of e-commerce patents has generated many complaints about
opportunistic patent litigation").

20041

OpportunisticBusiness Method Patent Licensing

1369

Their use by a patentee against a defendant is a way to generate
licensing revenue because it sends a message to the defendant that
the patentee is willing to litigate in order to enforce its patent
rights.6 2 "Small companies may not be willing to invest resources
in such a challenge, especially with the presumption of [patent]
validity that attends PTO decisions. Rather, it may make more
sense for these companies to accept a license fee from the patentee,
Thus,
thereby leaving the inappropriate patent unchallenged."
what was really a weak lawsuit, because of the overbroad business
method patent, now turns into a "credible" one solely because of
the cost that litigating it would impose on the defendant."
B. The Damage Caused to the Public via OpportunisticBusiness
Method Patent Licensing
It is understood that opportunistic patent litigation not only
damages the public at large, but it also does not further the law of
patents in any way.65 In addition, there is a social cost to having
bad patents issued that are then used to obtain licensing fees from

62. Adam T. Bernstein, Use Of Patent Enforcement to Drive a (Patent)
Licensing Program,740 PRAC. L. INST. 707, 716 (2003).
There are many examples of companies or individuals who have
vigorously asserted their patent(s) against whole industries (or even
against a number of different industries), who have collected tens (or
hundreds) or millions of dollars in royalties, and who have brought
multiple suits for patent infringement against any number of
defendants.
Id. See also Meurer, supra note 61, at 509-10 (discussing predatory patent
litigation).
63. DiMatteo, supra note 22, at 23. See Jon Van, E-commerce Suit Exposes
Fuzzy Patent Laws, San Diego Company Picks Fights with Small, Out-of-State
Companies, Demands Steep Licensing Fees, AKRON BEACON J., Feb. 2, 2003, at
1 [hereinafter Van, E-commerce Suit Exposes Fuzzy Patent Laws] (discussing
opportunistic patent licensing), 2003 WL 2472139.
64. See Meurer, supra note 61, at 516 (reasoning that because "[diefendants
fear the high cost of IP litigation[, they] settle opportunistic claims to avoid
that cost"); Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological
Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 163, 168-69 (2000).
Plaintiffs in frivolous litigation are likely to have an advantage in
settlement negotiations in that they are relatively more risk seeking
than defendants. Because trial is more attractive to plaintiffs than
defendants, plaintiffs are likely to demand more, and defendants are
likely to offer more, than the expected value of plaintiffs' claims. If
there is sufficient bargaining overlap between plaintiffs' inflated
demands and defendants' inflated offers, the litigants in frivolous
litigation will likely settle their disputes for an amount greater than the
expected value of the litigation.

Id.
65. See Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986, 993 (9th Cir. 1979)
(stating that "[patent] infringement actions initiated and conducted in bad
faith contribute nothing to the furtherance of the policies of either the patent
law or the antitrust law").
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defendants, who cannot afford to fight the patent's validity.6 "It is
as important to the public that competition should not be
repressed by worthless patents, as that the patentee of a really
valuable invention should be protected in his monopoly.""
Patent licensing is a 110 billion dollar business.' When bad
patents are used against defendants who then pay for a license,
Many
the cost is inevitably passed onto the consumer.'
defendants will choose to pay the licensing fee and forego the costs
that they would incur if they were to challenge the patent's
validity. °
The court system even realizes the huge expense associated
"[Olne of the benefits accruing to a
with patent litigation.'
businessman accepting a license from a patentee who was
threatening him with a suit was avoiding 'the necessity of
defending an expensive infringement action during the period
when he may be least able to afford one."'72 With the cost of patent
lawsuits often stretching into the millions of dollars and taking
many years to complete, 3 few defendants, and even fewer small
defendants, are capable of footing the bill. 4

66. See Mark A. Lemley, RationalIgnorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1495, 1515-17 (2001) (explaining the social costs of bad patents).
67. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 663-64 (1968) (citing Pope Mfg. Co. v.
Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 234 (1892)).
68. See Rodriguez, supra note 27, at 9 (stating that "[platent and licensing
revenue has increased 700 percent compared with the last eight years to 110
billion in 1999").
69. See Rizzo, supra note 19, at 365 (concluding that because of "licensing
costs, Internet licensees will be forced to pass those costs onto their
consumers"); Lemley, supra note 66, at 1515-17 (discussing the social costs of
bad patents that are issued).
70. See Lear, 395 U.S. at 673 (concluding that "the cost of prosecuting slowmoving trial proceedings and defending an inevitable appeal might well deter
many licensees from attempting to prove patent invalidity in the courts");
Roberts, supra note 29, at 74 (quoting Jeet Singh discussing why his company
chose to settle a patent litigation suit rather than fight it out in court).
Specifically, Mr, Singh stated that "[s]ettling the [patent infringement]
suit... had little to do with the patent's merits, and everything to do with a
desire to resolve the issue and get on with business in a fast-growing market."
Id. He went on to explain that "[playing even a stiff fee made better business
sense than continuing to fight [because] it is to our advantage to put our
resources into growing the business, rather than slogging through this
complex and costly legal process." Id.
71. Blonder-Tongue Lab. Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 334
(1971).
72. Id. (citing Lear, 395 U.S. at 669). Interestingly, in Blonder-Tongue, the
court noted that in 1971, the average patent litigation cost was $50,000. Id.
73. See Bernstein, supra note 62, at 713 (noting that "[platent litigation can
be a particularly time-consuming and expensive process - typically several
years and at least several millions of dollars").
74. See Van, E-Commerce Patent Threat Firms, supra note 55 (quoting
Sharon Barner's explanation of how "[p]atent litigation tends to be long and
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Furthermore, "the existence of an unchallenged patent may
deter others from attempting to compete with the licensee.
"[The] [l]icensees may often be the only individuals with enough
economic incentive to challenge the patentability of an inventor's
discovery. If they are muzzled, the public may continually be
required to pay tribute to would-be monopolists without need or
justification.""
Those defendants that choose not to fight it out in court, nor
pay the licensing fee, are left incapable of using a piece of
technology that should not be patented." As a result, it will now
be harder for "e-commerce to flourish"" due to this "destructive
approach to innovation".9
Furthermore, the licensing of bad patents also causes the
public to lose faith in the USPTO and the patent system as a
whole." Such a reduction in credibility of the patent system "may
reduce the value of good patents, and therefore harm innovation."'
Overall, opportunistic patent licensing not only causes the
innocent defendant to pay the licensing fee, but it forces the public
to pay the price as well.
C. New Weapons in the OpportunisticPatent LicensingArsenal
Today, many patentees use the Internet as a way to deter

costly"). Ms. Barner states that "[iun the beginning you fight on principle, but
the costs add up quickly. The average cost of a piece of patent litigation is $1
million. That's a significant amount of money when you can settle for $10,000
or $15,000." Id. Accord Rodriguez, supra note 27 (reasoning that licensees
"pa[y] [licensing] fees only because it is cheaper than the customary $500,000
to $1 million to fight the patent lawsuit"); Stephan Nickels & Jeffrey
Simmons, Western District of Wisconsin Court Proves Speedy and Affordable
Venue
for
Patent
Litigation
at
http'//www.foley.com/pubications/pub-detail.aspx?pubid
=163&fulldesc=1 (July 21, 2001) (discussing the high cost of patent
infringement suits: "a patent litigant can expect to spend at least $500,00 and
up to $6 million to try a patent case"). See also Philip Judson, IP Litigationa
Costly but Real Concern in High Tech, 22 AUSTIN Bus. J. 18 (noting the
expense in patent litigation); Lemley, supra note 66, at 1507-13 (discussing in
depth the cost of patent litigation).
75. Lear, 395 U.S. at 669.
76. Id. at 670. See Blair & Cotter, supra note 18, at 1363 (concluding that
"the defendant might find it more cost-effective simply to give up [on the
lawsuit] and purchase a license from the patent owner. But if, in fact, that
patent is invalid. . . , then the social costs flowing from the licensee's
acceptance of the patentee's exclusive rights would seem to outweigh the social
benefits").
77. See Lemley, supra note 66, at 1515-17 (discussing the social costs of bad
patents that are issued).
78. Thrum, supra note 11.
79. See id. (quoting Tim O'Reilly).
80. Lemley, supra note 66, at 1522-23 (2001).
81. Id. at 1522.
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would-be defendants from infringing their business method
patent. They also use the Internet as a way to gain licensing
revenues for issued business method patents.
A great example of such Internet use is by Pangaea
Intellectual Properties L.L.C. ("PanIP")."2 PanIP is a plaintiff
currently involved in many infringement lawsuits regarding two of
its business method patents.' PanIP uses the internet to detail its
past successes in obtaining licensing fees from small defendants.
This is an interesting way to encourage other small defendants to
also pay the licensing fees.'
Plaintiffs are not the only ones using the Internet in order to
gain leverage.' Some of the defendants in the PanIP lawsuits are
banding together in an attempt to gain outside financial and
litigation support via their Internet website entitled "You May Be
Next.com."6 On the website, the authors question PanIP's motives
82. PanIP, PanIP Patent & Trademark Infringement Litigation, at
http://www.panip.com/litigation.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2003) [hereinafter
PanIPLitigation].
83. U.S. Patent No. 5,576,951 (issued Nov. 19, 1996); U.S. Patent No.
6,289,319 (issued Sept. 11, 2003). The '951 patent is entitled "Automated
sales and services system," and is "[a] system for composing individualized
sales presentations created from various textual and graphical information
data sources to match customer profiles." U.S. Patent No. 5,776,951. The '319
patent is entitled "Automatic business and financial transaction processing
system" and is:
[a] system for filing applications with an institution from a plurality of
remote sites, and for automatically processing said applications in
response to each applicant's credit rating obtained from a credit
reporting service comprising a series of self-service terminals remotely
linked via a telephone line to a first computer at the institution and to a
second computer at the credit reporting service headquarters.
U.S. Patent No. 6,289,319. While this author draws no conclusions as to the
validity or merits of the patents at issue, the case is brought to the reader's
attention because it is a large corporation currently pursuing licensing fees
from several small defendants for alleged business method patent
infringement. See generally PanIP Litigation, supra note 82 (discussing the
many lawsuits in which PanIP is involved); PanIP, Decisions, at
http://www.panip.com/decisions.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2003) (discussing the
court decisions in which PanIP is involved); PanIP, Defaults, at
http://www.panip.com/defaults.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2003) (discussing the
default judgments that PanIp received). For other authors' views of the PanIP
lawsuits, see Van, Small Online Retailers Targeted, supra note 10 (explaining
the PanIP lawsuits). See also Van, E-Commerce Patent Threat Firms, supra
note 55 (discussing the PanIP lawsuits); Anna Wolfe, On-Line Retailers Sued
for Patent Infringement, GOURMET NEWS (Dec. 2002) (noting the PanIP
lawsuits), http://www.gourmetnews.comdecember2002/depts/gn/gnstoryl.htm.
84. See Bernstein, supra note 62, at 718-19 (discussing the many ways to
"encourage [e] such other [s] to take a license while the litigation is pending").
85. See Jon Van, Firm Claims Patent On E-Commerce, BRADENTON
HERALD, Feb. 2, 2003, at 2 (explaining how PanIP defendants are attempting
to use the Internet to gain leverage), 2003 WL 2526822.
86. Postings from PanIP defendants can be viewed at You May Be Next, at
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as being an opportunistic patent litigation and licensing scheme."
It is interesting to note that of the over fifty defendants that
PanIP targeted, most of the suits were brought within a few
months of each other.' Thus, it seems as though the plaintiff is
trying to attack as many small defendants as possible, all within
the same time, so as to limit each defendant's use of PanIp's past
litigation outcomes.89
Do the multiple PanIp lawsuits together act as an exemplar of
opportunistic patent licensing? The defendants appear to think
SO.

90

III. CURRENT PROTECTIONS FOR SMALL DEFENDANTS Do NOT WORK
Help me if you can, I'm feeling down
And I do appreciate you being round.
Help me, get my feet back on the ground,
Won't you please, please help me?9 '

Patent litigation is an expensive business which forces many
defendants to pay a licensing fee in order to avoid litigation costs.9
However, there are many protections for defendants faced with
litigation. Such protections include rule 1 1, 93 the Patent Act's feeshifting statute,94 declaratory judgments,95 summary judgment,'
http://www.youmaybenext.com (last visited July 6, 2004).
87. Within this case, it is interesting to note that the plaintiff seems to be
going after small on-line retailers that are all located outside the venue of
where the lawsuits are being brought.
See You May Be Next, at
http://www.youmaybenext.com/why.html [hereinafter PanIP Defendants Ask
Why] (questioning PanIP's motives for suing these particular defendants);
PanIP Litigation, supra note 82. Thus, it seems as though the plaintiff is
further attempting to burden the defendants by picking a venue that is
inconvenient to them, in order to encourage them to pay the licensing fee. See
id. (asking questions about PanIP's motives for suing these particular
defendants in a particular venue).
88. Id.
89. See id. (noting the high number of defendants sued by PanIP in a short
period of time).
90. See id. (questioning PanIP's motives for suing these particular
defendants).
91. The Beatles, Help!, on HELP! (Capitol Records 1990).
92. See Lemley, supra note 66, at 1494-1511 (discussing the high cost of
patent litigation); Jeffrey T. Haley, Strategies and Antitrust Limitations for
Multiple Potential Patent Infringers, 21 AIPLA Q. J., 327, 328 (1993)
(concluding that because patent litigation is very expensive, many defendants
would rather pay a licensing fee in order to avoid paying the money to
litigate).
93. FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
94. See 35 U.S.C. § 285 (stating that "[tihe court in exceptional cases may
award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party").
95. See Bayer AG v. Housey Phar., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367, 1369 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (holding in the case where an alleged patent infringer brought a suit
seeking a declaratory judgment that the patents were invalid).
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the First Inventor Defense Act,97 the Patent Reexamination
Process, and class actions.98
These protections for defendants faced with litigation will be
discussed in the following subsections. The following subsections
will also discuss the fact that these protections fail to protect small
defendants from opportunistic business method patent licensing."
A. Rule 11 Does Not Protect Small Defendants
Rule 11 is a federal rule of civil procedure stating that when a
person represents something to the court, it does so with a certain
amount of knowledge and with a purpose other than to harass its
adversary.1 " It states when a party presents any pleading, paper
or motion to the court, it does so with the indication that such
document submitted is based on the party's "knowledge,
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under
the circumstances. " 1°1
The party submitting the document further asserts that "it is
not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or
to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation. " " Furthermore, the party asserts that the "claims,
defenses, and other legal contentions" contained within the
document are "warranted by existing law.""°' Finally, the party
submitting a document to the court asserts that the "allegations
and other factual contentions have evidentiary support."'
If a person violates rule 11 by submitting a document to the
court in violation of the assertions detailed above, the person is
subject to sanctions by the court."9
96. FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
97. 35 U.S.C. § 273.
98. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (2003).
99. See Lemley, supra note 66, at 1494-1511 (discussing the high cost of
patent litigation often times forces many small defendants to settle in order to
avoid paying excessive litigation fees).
100. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. Rule 11 states that

By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or
later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney
or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable
under the circumstances,-

(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass
or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation ....
FED. R. CIv. P. 11(B).
101. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
102. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1).
103. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2).
104. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3).
105. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c). Rule 11(c) states that
[i]f, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court
determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject
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Thus, because of rule 11, some may argue that a plaintiff,
who thinks that its patent will fail in court, would be deterred
from filing a lawsuit claiming that the small defendant infringed
the patent."
However, such an argument fails because of the
presumption of validity that is associated with a patent." '
Therefore, it will be almost impossible to show the requisite
"claims... are [uniwarranted"in order to obtain rule 11 sanctions
since issued patents enter all disputes with the presumption of
validity." Thus, rule 11 fails to protect the small defendant from
opportunistic business method patent licensing.
B. The PatentAct's Fee-Shifting Statute Does Not Protect Small
Defendants
The fee-shifting statute under the Patent Act allows the court
to award attorney's fees in "exceptional" patent cases. 1°9 This feeshifting statute is intended not only to benefit plaintiffs, but is also
intended to benefit defendants if the case meets the requisite
requirement of being "exceptional.""' Thus, the court can order
the plaintiff to pay attorney's fees if the plaintiff brings suit
against a defendant for a patent that is obviously invalid."'
Some commentators argue that this statute "deters
to the conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the
attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are
responsible for the violation.
FED. R. Crv. P. 11(c).
106. Weidinger, supra note 56, at 1210-11 (discussing the many
shortcomings of rule 11 in patent litigation).
107. See Lear, 395 U.S. at 670 (explaining that every issued United States
patent is presumed to be valid). See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (stating that "[a] patent
shall be presumed valid .... The burden of establishing invalidity of a patent
or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity").
108. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2). See Lear, 395 U.S. at 670 (noting that "the
licensor's case is buttressed by the presumption of validity which attaches to
his patent"). See generally Kenneth R. Adamo, Basic Motion Practice for the
Accused Infringer, 15 AIPLA Q. J. 124, 132-34 (1987) (discussing rule 11).
109. 35 U.S.C. § 285. The Act states that "[tihe court in exceptional cases
may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party." Id.
110. Kaehni v. Diffraction Co., 342 F. Supp. 523, 533-36 (D. Md. 1972)
(discussing the purpose of 35 U.S.C. § 285), affd 473 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 854 (1983).
111. Kaehni, 342 F. Supp. at 534-35.
[An] example [of a situation where the court can award attorney fees] is
[where] a plaintiff-patentee prosecut[es] on the basis of an obviously
invalid patent .... No court holding or rule of law prohibits declaring a
case 'exceptional' and awarding attorneys' fees on the ground that the
allegation of infringement is frivolous and/or brought without
reasonable care... . This court now holds that a case can be
'exceptional' within the meaning of §285 where the allegation of
infringement is frivolous and/or asserted without reasonable care and
sufficient justification.
Id. (emphasis added).
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opportunistic suits by raising the expected cost of weak lawsuits
and undermining the credibility of the plaintiffs threat to go to
trial.""2 However, this argument lacks merit when the defendant
is one with little resources."'
Defendants that lack $1 million (i.e., sufficient resources to
fight a patent infringement claim and to overcome the
presumption that the business method is valid"4 ) will still be
enticed to settle the frivolous infringement dispute despite the
prospect of a future award of attorney's fees."' This is because a
small defendant, who goes bankrupt before even seeing the light at
the end of the tunnel, is not benefited by the Patent Act's feeshifting statute."6
Therefore, despite the fact that the plaintiff knowingly files a
frivolous lawsuit alleging infringement by the small defendant of
its business method patent that a court would find overbroad, and
despite the fact that the defendant could be awarded attorney's
fees in this "exceptional" case, the small defendant will still be
forced to pay the patentee's licensing fee." 7 Hence, the Patent
Act's fee-shifting statute fails to protect small defendants from
opportunistic business method patent licensing.
C. DeclaratoryJudgments Do Not Protect Small Defendants
Suits seeking a declaratory judgment exist in patent
litigation."" When a plaintiff threatens a defendant with a patent
infringement lawsuit, the defendant can respond by filing a suit
seeking a declaratory judgment."9 A suit seeking a declaratory
judgment will have the court make a finding as to the patent's

112. Meurer, supra note 61, at 535-40 (explaining.the benefits of the Patent

Act's fee-shifting statute in deterring frivolous lawsuits).
113. Id. at 537.
114. Van, E-Commerce Patent Threat Firms, supra note 55 (noting that the
average cost of patent litigation is around $1 million).
115. See Meurer, supra note 61, at 537 (discussing the Patent Act's feeshifting statute and how it influences the defendant's behavior in litigation);
Van, E-Commerce Patent Threat Firms, supra note 55 (concluding that many

defendants will settle to forgo the high cost of patent litigation).
116. See Meurer, supra note 61, at 537 (discussing how many small

defendants go bankrupt in fighting patent infringement disputes).
117. See id. at 537-38.
The most aggressive predatory litigation strives to choke off financial
resources from the defendant. The prospect of recovering attorney's fees
after trial has no value to a defendant who goes bankrupt before trial,

and perhaps little value to a defendant who suffers financial distress
because of trial cost and delay.

Id.
118. See Bayer, 340 F.3d at 1369 (stating that alleged infringer brought a
suit seeking declaratory judgment).
119. Id.
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validity.
A suit seeking a declaratory judgment seems to be an effective
way for a defendant to avoid plaintiff-initiated patent litigation by
having the court make a finding of fact as to whether the patent is
invalid. However, to come to such a conclusion would require one
to forget about the financial backing required by the defendant to
win a suit seeking a declaratory judgment.12'
All issued patents enter the courtroom arena with a
presumption of validity.12' Thus, in order for the defendant to win
a suit seeking a declaratory judgment, the defendant still needs to
overcome the strong presumption that the plaintiffs patent is
valid."13 To do so will require discovery and24 thus, sufficient
resources available to the defendant to pay for it."
Small defendants will not be capable of paying for discovery
costs that often times exceed $800,000.12' Therefore, the defendant
will not be effective in a suit seeking a declaratory judgment,
6
despite the fact that the business method patent is overbroad.1
D. Summary Judgment Does Not Protect Small Defendants
Rule 56 allows a party to be granted summary judgment if
"the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."" ' The
question of a patent's8 validity is not a question of fact, but rather
is a question of law."
A motion for summary judgment will often be ineffective

120. See EMC Corp. v. Norand Corp., 89 F.3d 807, 811 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(discussing that in a declaratory judgment suit, the court will determine the
patent's validity).
121. Meurer, supra note 61, at 528-30 (noting declaratory judgments in
patent disputes).
122. Lear, 395 U.S. at 670 (stating that there is a presumption of validity
associated with every issued United States patent). See Canon Computer
Sys., Inc. v. Nu-Kote Int'l, Inc., 134 F.3d 1085, 1088 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(explaining that the presumption of a patent's validity exists at every stage of

litigation).
123. Uniroyal Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d 1044, 1050 (Fed. Cir.

1988) (discussing that the party disputing the patent's validity must do so by
clear and convincing evidence).
124. Meurer, supra note 61, at 529-30.
125. See Vermont, supra note 8, at 360 n.2 (noting the high cost of patent
discovery).
126. See Canon, 134 F.3d at 1088 (stating that the existence of the patent

alone is capable of satisfying the patentee's burden on the issue of the patent's
validity).
127. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). See generally Adamo, supra note 108, at 153-74
(discussing rule 56 being used in patent infringement lawsuits).
128. Uniroyal, 837 F.2d at 1050.
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before discovery because in order to be granted, there must be no
material facts in dispute. 1 9 Thus, discovery, a very expensive and
time-consuming process, must ordinarily be completed. 30
Discovery requires the defendant to have sufficient resources to
pay for it.'
Therefore, the small defendant sees itself in the same
predicament as it did in rule 11, fee-shifting, and declaratory
judgment situations. The small defendant, despite the fact that it
may succeed in a summary judgment motion based on the
invalidity of the business method patent, will be forced to pay the
licensing fee because it will be unable to afford the necessary cost
of discovery. 3 ' Accordingly, the small defendant is not protected
with the rule 56 summary judgment motion from opportunistic
business method patent licensing.
E.

The First Inventor Defense Act Does Not Protect Small
Defendants

The Patent Act contains a statute entitled "Defense to
Infringement Based on Earlier Inventor, " " known as the "First
Inventor Defense Act."134 The First Inventor Defense Act protects
defendants, acting in good faith, who have reduced the method to
practice at least one year prior to the filing date'35 of the business

129. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Scimed Life Sys., Inc., 988 F.2d
1157, 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993). See Meurer, supra note 61, at 530-31 (explaining
summary judgment in patent lawsuits).
130. Meurer, supra note 61, at 530-31 (reasoning that because "summary
judgment [is] a fact-intensive question[, it] may be delayed until timeconsuming and expensive discovery is completed").
131. See Vermont, supra note 8, at 360 n.2 (stating that patent discovery
costs are very high).
132. Meurer, supra note 61, at 531 (concluding that summary judgment
often provides poor protection in fact-intensive patent litigation). See BlonderTongue, 402 U.S. at 335 (explaining that "[i]f a patentee's expense is high
though he enjoys the benefits of the presumption of validity, the defendant in
an infringement suit will have even higher costs as he both introduces proof to
overcome the presumption and attempts to rebut whatever proof the patentee
offers to bolster the claims").

133. 35 U.S.C. § 273.
134. Allison & Tiller, supra note 27. See David A. Fox, Business Method
Patent: Feast or Famine?, CONN. L. TRIB., Jul. 21, 2003, at 9 (discussing the
First Inventor Defense Act).

135. The Act states in relevant part that
[iut
shall be a defense to an action for infringement under section 271 of
this title with respect to any subject matter that would otherwise
infringe one or more claims for a method in the patent being asserted
against a person, if such person had, acting in good faith, actually
reduced the subject matter to practice at least 1 year before the effective
filing date of such patent, and commercially used the subject matter
before the effective filing date of such patent.
35 U.S.C. § 273(b)(1).
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method patent and have commercially used 136the invention before
the filing date of the business method patent.
In order for a defendant to be successful in asserting the First
Inventor Defense Act, the defendant must establish the defense by
clear and convincing evidence. 3 7 Interestingly, if the defendant
raises the defense and fails to establish a "reasonable basis for
asserting the defense," the court shall find the case to be an
"exceptional" case for the purpose of 35 U.S.C. § 285, the feeshifting statute.'
Also interesting is that a patent will not be
deemed invalid just because the defendant raises or establishes the
first inventor defense. 39
The first inventor defense helps a defendant in establishing a
statutory weakness in enforcing business method patents.'
However, like the problems with the defendant protections
discussed earlier, the small defendant, due to its lack of sufficient
resources to effectively perform discovery, is still not benefited.
The small defendant will most likely not be able to afford the
discovery costs necessary to prove the defense by clear and
136. The term "method," as used in 35 U.S.C. § 273(b)(1), means "[a] method
of doing or conducting business." 35 U.S.C. § 273(a)(3). Thus, "a person may
not assert the defense under this section unless the invention for which the
defense is asserted is for a method." Id. § 273 (b)(3)(A). The statute is not
providing a general license, but one only "to the specific subject matter
claimed in the patent .... " Id. § 273 (b)(3)(C).
137. See 35 U.S.C. § 273(b)(4) (establishing the burden of proof and who
bears the burden of proof). Specifically, the Act states that "[a] person
asserting the defense under this section shall have the burden of establishing
the defense by clear and convincing evidence." Id. Furthermore, the Act
requires that the one asserting the defense be the person who performed the
required acts necessary to establish the defense. Id. § 273 (b)(6). The Act also
requires that
[tihe defense under this section may be asserted only by the person who
performed the acts necessary to establish the defense and, except for
any transfer to the patent owner, the right to assert the defense shall
not be licensed or assigned or transferred to another person except as an
ancillary and subordinate part of a good faith assignment or transfer for
other reasons of the entire enterprise or line of business to which the
defense relates.

Id.
138. Section (b)(8) provides:
[i]f the defense under this section is pleaded by a person who is found to
infringe the patent and who subsequently fails to demonstrate a
reasonable basis for asserting the defense, the court shall find the case
exceptional for the purpose of awarding attorney fees under section 285
of this title.
Id. § 273(b)(8) (emphasis added).
139. See 35 U.S.C. § 273(b)(9) (stating that "[a] patent shall not be deemed to
be invalid under section 102 or 103 of this title solely because a defense is
raised or established under this section" (emphasis added)).
140. Fox, supra note 134, at 9 (stating that the defense provides "an
additional weakness in enforcing business method patents not found in other
types of patents").
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convincing evidence, and thus, will still be subject to opportunistic
business method patent licensing.
F.

The PatentReexamination ProcessDoes Not Protect Small
Defendants

The patent reexamination process allows for a patent's
validity to be reexamined by the USPTO based on prior art. This
can be done via an ex parte process or an inter parte process.141
Although the inter parte process allows for a third party to seek
patent reexamination based on prior art,4 ' the reexamination
process does not protect small defendants.
First, in order to file for inter parte reexamination, the
requester must pay a $8,800 fee." Second, because the requester
must "set forth the pertinency and manner of applying cited prior
art to every claim for which reexamination is requested,"144 a
patent attorney most likely will have to be hired, and the small
defendant will have to spend money to have the prior art search
conducted (money that the small defendant cannot afford to
spend). Third, "the party requesting reexamination has very
limited opportunity to present its point of view after the initial
filing, and under section 311, has very limited opportunity to
present its point of view in an appeal."4

141. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-307 (setting forth the ex parte reexamination
process). Section 302 provides that
any person at any time may file a request for reexamination by the
Office of any claim of a patent on the basis of any prior art cited under
the provisions of section 301 of this title ....

The request must set forth

the pertinency and manner of applying cited prior art to every claim for
which reexamination is requested.
Id. § 302. See also 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-318 (setting forth the inter parte
reexamination process); 35 U.S.C. § 311(a) (stating that "[any third-party
requester at any time may file a request for inter partes reexamination by the
Office of a patent on the basis of any prior art cited under the provisions of
section 301"); M. Patricia Thayer, Rocket Dockets: What, When and Where, 619
PRACTISING L. INST. PATS., COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS & LITERARY PROP.
COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 51, 58-61 (2000) (giving an overview of the patent
reexamination process).
142. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b)(2).
143. 2004 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE FEE SCHEDULE, available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/qs/ope/fee2004jul26.htm (last visited Aug.
2, 2004). Notably, the ex parte reexamination fee is only $2,520. Id.
144. Id.
145. 1 LEE CARL BROMBERG, BUSINESS TORTS IN MASSACHUSETrS, PATENT

INFRINGEMENT § 6.11.1 (2002). "A third-party requester whose request for an
inter partes reexamination results in an order under section 313 is estopped
from asserting at a later time, in any civil action arising in whole or in part
under section 1338 of title 28, the invalidity of any claim finally determined to
be valid and patentable on any ground which the third party requester raised
or could have been raised during the inter partes reexamination proceedings."
35 U.S.C. § 315(c).
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However, despite the fact that the reexamination process
looks at prior art, if the USPTO director determines that there is
not a "substantial new question of patentability affecting any
claim of the patent,"" then the concerned challenger cannot
appeal the "determination that no substantial new question of
patentability has been raised."'47
The reexamination process does not protect the small
defendant. Therefore, "[tihere is a need to have something short of
litigation, but more expansive [than re-examinations]," says Jon
Dudas, acting undersecretary of commerce for intellectual
property and acting director of the USPTO."
G. Class Actions Do Not Protect Small Defendants
Defendant class actions 4 ' are permitted in patent disputes.9 °
They are "a procedural device whereby an entire class of
defendants can be bound to a judgment although some individual
member did not participate in the litigation but were [sic]
represented by named class representatives.""'
In patent
litigation, class actions are a rare occurrence."' This is due in part
to the difficulty in meeting the many requirements that rule 23
requires in order for a class to be certified."
It is well settled that if a patentee's patent is declared invalid
by a court of competent jurisdiction in a case involving Defendant

146. 35 U.S.C. § 312(a).
147. See 35 U.S.C. § 312(c) (stating that "[a] determination by the Director
under subsection (a) shall be final and non-appealable").
148. Christine Hines, At Home and Abroad, Dudas Weighs in, LEGAL TIMES,
July 19, 2004, at 60.
149. Class actions are governed by rule 23. FED. R. Civ. P. 23. The
prerequisites of a class action are:
[olne or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative
parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of
all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
150. Tracor, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 176 U.S.P.Q. 505, 507-08 (N.D. Ill.
1973) (reasoning that while this group of defendants did not meet the requisite
requirements in order to be certified as a class, defendant class actions are
permitted).
151. Robert E. Holo, Defendant Class Actions: The Failure of Rule 23 and a
Proposed Solution, 38 UCLA L. REV. 223, 223 (1990).
152. Adamo, supra note 108, at 137.
153. See id. at 138-39 (explaining the many difficulties and hurdles that
must be addressed in order to have a class certified in a patent action); Holo,
supra note 151, at 249-57 (discussing the many obstacles that must be
overcome in order for a class to be certified in a patent dispute).
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A, it will be invalid against all other defendants.TM However, as
discussed earlier, it is often times hard for a small defendant to
prove invalidity due to the strong presumption of validity and the
high cost of discovery and litigation.'
Thus, it would seem that a
defendant-certified class action would be the cure-all for the
financially deficient defendant since such certification would allow
the defendants to pool together their resources.'
There are many benefits to a class action lawsuit for a
defendant class such as a common defense fund, a unified defense,
and the award of attorney's fees." 7 Despite the benefits, class
actions often times fail to protect small defendants for a number of
reasons."15 First, many times potential defendants are competitors
of each other.15' Thus, "no one company has an incentive to
organize a meeting of the competitors
or lead the group to make an
160
effective plan" against the patentee.
Another problem with class actions is that often times a
potential defendant will be unwilling to share with other potential
defendants its use of the business method for fear of disseminating
its trade secrets to competitors. Similarly, with the high cost of
patent litigation,"' many potential defendants that lack resources
will be forced to drop out because of the inability to
foot their fair
12
share of the business method patent validity fight.
154. Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 350. See Blair & Cotter, supra note 18, at
1356-58 (explaining patent invalidity estoppel); Holo, supra note 151, at 24952 (discussing the implications of Blonder-Tongue, holding when a previously
adjudicated patent is declared invalid; it is also invalid if the patentee
attempts to assert the patent against a different defendant); Haley, supra note
92, at 328 (discussing Blonder-Tongue, stating that "[a] patent cannot be valid
for some potential infringers and invalid for others. Consequently,... if a
patent is declared invalid in a binding proceeding in a United States court, all
other potential infringers have the benefits of collateral estoppel to prevent
the enforcement of the patent against them"). However, the converse does not
apply (i.e. if a patent is determined to be valid in a suit involving Defendant A,
in a subsequent lawsuit Defendant B can seek to prove invalidity). Id. at 337
n.2.
155. Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 335-36 (noting the high cost of patent
litigation that is especially put on the defendant due to the presumption of an
issued patent's validity).
156. Defendant ClassActions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 630, 630-32 (1978).
157. Haley, supra note 92, at 328-31 (explaining the many benefits of the
certified defendant class).
158. Id. (discussing the many reasons why class actions fail to protect
defendants).
159. Id. at 330-31, 335 (noting that often times the defendants in multipledefendant patent lawsuits are competitors).
160. Id. at 330-31.
161. See Van, Small Online Retailers Targeted, supra note 10 (discussing the
high cost of patent litigation).
162. See id. (stating that while some small-business operators attempt to
"band together" in order to fight "what appears to be an unreasonable
[business method patent infringement] lawsuit," many of those operators drop
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Furthermore, many small defendants would prefer to pay the
$10,000 to $15,000 licensing fee rather than continue to contribute
funds to battle the patent's validity." Thus, as with the other
protections for defendants that fail to protect small defendants
from opportunistic business method patent licensing, so too the
class action fails.
Overall, there are many protections for defendants in
litigation.
However, these protections fail to protect small
defendants involved in patent litigation from opportunistic
business method patent licensing.
IV. THE PATENT VALIDITY COURT
But I feel that a change is,
A change is gonna come.
I said I feel so alive now.
And you know I feel that a change is,
A change is gonna come.164
In 1982 the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit was legislated into being" and given limited jurisdiction."
As of 2002, the Federal Circuit overturned over twenty percent of
the district court decisions. 67 This results in the current process
for litigating a patent dispute to be "drawn out" and full of
Those delays, along with the high cost of
inevitable delays."
the poor
litigation,'69 the presumption of the patent's validity,'
out "as [ the road gets long," due to the high cost of patent litigation and the
strong incentive to settle for significantly less money).
163. See id. (concluding that many small defendants would rather pay the
"$10,000 or $15,000" licensing fee than to contribute to litigation expenses).
164. Candlebox, Change, on CANDLEBOX (Maverick Records 1993).
165. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat.
25. ("An Act to establish a United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit"); See Jeffrey W. Tayon, The Federal Transfer Statute: 28 U.S.C.
§ 1631, 29 S.TEx. L. REV. 189, 200 (1987) (stating that "[tihe major focus on
the 1982 Act was on creation of a new, specialized federal appellate court
known as the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit").
166. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (establishing the jurisdiction of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit).
167. 2002 U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIR.ANN. REP. 114 tbl. B-8,
at httpJ/www.fedcir.gov/pdf/bO8sepO2.pdf.
available
'168. Arianne
H. De Govia & Timothy D. Casey, Arbitration of Patent
Licenses Comes with Risks: Panel Could End Up Issuing Rulings on Such
Substantive Aspects as Validity and Scope, NAT'L L.J., Sep. 23, 2002, at B16
col. 1 (discussing the "drawn-out process of patent litigation" and the delays,
high costs, etc. associated with it that forces many to arbitrate patent license
agreements rather than using the traditional means of litigation). See
Guthrie, supra note 64, at 171-72 (discussing modeling frivolous lawsuits).
169. See Beem, supra note 8 (noting the high cost of patent litigation that
ranges from an average cost of $797,000 up through discovery and around $1.5
million up through trial).
170. See Lear, 395 U.S. at 670 (explaining that patents are presumed valid).
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quality of many business method patents,'17' and the lack of
protections for small defendants from opportunistic business
method patent licensing 72 all lead to the conclusion that there
needs to be a change in the way that patents are litigated.1 73 Thus,
I propose creating the Patent Validity Court (PV-Court), whose
sole function will be to determine the validity of a business method
patent that is allegedly infringed.
The establishment of the PV-Court is the next logical step
from the current system which already makes use of a special
hearing, known as a Markman7 hearing, for construing claims
which must be done before a finding of the patent's validity is
made.'
As will be detailed below,7 6 the PV-Court judges and
workers will be individuals with more than just a basic
understanding of patent law, 7 7 and as such will be better able to
technical and scientific issues seen exclusively
deal with the highly
7
1
in patent law.
171. See Merges, supra note 34, at 591 (discussing the poor quality of
business method patents).
172. See supra part III (explaining that current litigation protections for
defendants fail to protect the small defendant).
173. See Lemley, supra note 66, at 1495-1511 (explaining the many problems
with the PTO and the need for change).
174. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
175. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 372-91 (discussing how a patent's claims
must be construed before a validity determination may be made); Oakley, Inc.
v. Sunglass Hut Int'l, 316 F.3d 1331, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (explaining the
process for determining a patent's validity).
An assessment of the likelihood of validity of a patent claim over the
prior art ...involves a two-step process. The first step is the same claim
construction implicated in an infringement analysis. The second step
involves a comparison of the asserted claims with the prior art.
Id. (citation omitted). Accord Smiths Indus. Med. Systems, Inc. v. Vital Signs,
is wellInc., 183 F.3d 1347, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (detailing that "[i]t
established that the first step in any validity analysis is to construe the claims
of the invention to determine the subject matter for which patent protection is
sought"). See also Holmes J. Hawkins III, Claim Interpretation in a PostMarkman Environment, 572 PRACISING L. INST./PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS,
TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROP. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 681, 688
(explaining that "a 'Markman hearing' or 'Markman trial,'... is an
evidentiary hearing or mini-trial held prior to any decision on infringement or
validity for the purpose of construing the patent claims"); Eric C. Harrell,
Casenote, Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1029,
1030-36 (1997) (discussing the Markman opinion); Doris Johnson Hines &
Esther H. Lim, How to Prepare & Conduct Markman Hearings 2002:
Markman Practice: Past and Present, 714 PRACISING. L. INST. PATENTS,
COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROP. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES
581, 583-84 (2002) (explaining what a Markman hearing is).
176. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the benefits of establishing the PVCourt).
177. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the logistics of the PV-Court).
178. Notably, the Court in Markman stated that:
[p]atent construction in particular is a special occupation, requiring, like
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Subsection A will discuss the logistics of the PV-Court.
Subsection B will discuss how the PV-Court benefits small
defendants from opportunistic business method patent licensing
and what disadvantages such a system may pose.
A. The Logistics of the PV-Court
1.

What the PV-Court Is Not

The PV-Court will not be run as an arbitration group, which
is currently permitted under the Voluntary Arbitration Act.179 The
Act permits the parties to arbitrate the patent's validity,
infringement matters, and whether it is enforceable."1 ° However,
the Voluntary Arbitration Act requires the parties to agree to
arbitrate.'
Thus, it seems unlikely that any plaintiff that is
attempting to bleed the small defendant out of all its money, in
order to obtain a licensing fee, would be willing to arbitrate,
despite the fact that arbitration might be easier.
Furthermore, "arbitrators still cannot single-handedly
invalidate patents,"'' nor should they be given that power,
because of the effect that patents have on the public." Instead,
all others, special training and practice. The judge, from his training
and discipline, is more likely to give a proper interpretation to such
instruments than a jury; and he is, therefore, more likely to be right, in
performing such a duty, than a jury can be expected to be.
Markman, 517 U.S. at 388-89 (citation omitted). Thus, a logical conclusion
from this is that a judge having specialized legal training pertaining to patent
law is better equipped to construe patent claims than a judge without such
specialized training.
179. 35 U.S.C. § 294.
180. Id. § 294(a).
A contract involving a patent or any right under a patent may contain a
provision requiring arbitration of any dispute relating to patent validity
or infringement arising under the contract. In the absence of such a
provision, the parties to an existing patent validity or infringement
dispute may agree in writing to settle such dispute by arbitration. Any
such provision or agreement shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
except for any grounds that exist at law or in equity for revocation of a
contract.
Id. See De Govia & Casey, supra note 168 (explaining the significance of 35
U.S.C. § 294).
181. See 35 U.S.C. § 294 (stating that the parties may agree to arbitrate a
patent lawsuit in two ways: 1) anticipatorily agree by a contract or 2) once
involved in a patent dispute, the parties may agree to arbitrate by a writing).
182. De Govia & Casey, supra note 168. See Ballard Med. Prods. v. Wright,
823 F.2d 527, 531 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (discussing arbitration).
183. See Dutch D. Chung, The Preclusive Effect of State Court Adjudication
and the Federal Courts' Choice of PreclusionLaws, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 707,
752 (2000) (stating that "[aittention must be given, however, to other factors
which argue against giving preclusive effect to the state court determination,
including the 'special public interest' in ensuring that good patents are upheld
and bad patents are stricken").
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the ability to declare a patent invalid should remain with the
courts and not the parties' arbitrators.
The USPTO will not run the PV-Court. This is to help avoid a
possible conflict of interest that may arise if patent examiners
were asked to invalidate a patent that a fellow colleague allowed
to be issued.
Instead of functioning as an arbitration hearing or being run
by the USPTO, the PV-Court will function as a court because it
will be run as a federal district court. Like the Federal Circuit,"5
it will be legislated with the power to decide issues based in a
highly technical area of law-the area of patent validity.
Deciding the validity of a challenged business method patent will
be the sole responsibility of the PV-Court.
2.

The InauguralYears of the PV-Court

The PV-Court's duty during its first few years of existence
will be that of only adjudicating the validity of business method
patents. This is because to overhaul the entire patent system by
requiring all patents' validity to be adjudicated in this manner
could be dangerous if the system fails or needs to be significantly
changed."' Thus, since the majority of the problems associated
with the validity of patents are associated with business method
patents, the PV-Court will start by considering the validity of
business method patents alone.
The PV-Court will consist of Patent Validity Judges (PVJudges) and Prior Art Investigators (PAIs). Each business method
patent's validity that is questioned will be assigned to one PVJudge and a plurality of PAls.
3. The Requirements and Role of the PV-Judge
The role of PV-Judge will be an appointed position, similar to

184. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (detailing the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit).
For example, the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over an appeal

from the decision of:
the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences of the United States
Patent and Trademark Office with respect to patent applications and
interferences, at the instance of an applicant for a patent or any party to
a patent interference, and any such appeal shall waive the right of such
applicant or party to proceed under section 145 or 146 of title 35 ....
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A).
185. See Martha J. Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a Structural Overhaul
of the Federal Courts, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 11, 73 (1996) (describing changes in
the federal court system and how Congress moves slowly before making such
changes, in order to study the problems, issues, and possible solutions).
186. See Thrum, supra note 11 (concluding that there are many problems
with business method patents over non-business method patents); Jones,
supra note 13 (explaining the problem with many business method patents is
that they are overbroad and invalid).
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other federal district judiciary positions,'
requiring that the
person selected be one who evinces a strong background in patent
litigation and patent prosecution. Furthermore, the PV-Judge
candidate must evince a strong understanding of business
methods and models, be it by having held significant positions in
the business market, having served as a corporate attorney
advising businesses, holding an M.B.A., etc. This will help to
insure that the judge determining the validity of a business
method patent not only understand patents but the business
methods that patentees may be patenting.'
The PV-Judge's role
will be to handle her docket of patent validity challenges and to
ultimately determine the patent's validity. 89
4.

The Requirements and Role of the PAls

The PAIs will consist of those that possess skills similar to
that which the PV-Judge embodies. The PAI candidate must hold
a Juris Doctor, have exceptionally sound research skills, and
greatly understand business methods and models.
The PAI
candidate must also embody a strong understanding of patent
prosecution, especially the requirements found in 35 U.S.C. §§ 101,
102, and 103.'90
A PAI's most significant role will be to conduct an
independent investigation as to the prior art relating to the
business method patent. To do this, the PAIs duty is to search for
prior art will not be restricted to solely the USPTO databases.
This is because, as discussed earlier,19' the chances of finding the
business method patent's prior art in the USPTO databases alone
is slim."n Therefore, the PAls will be charged with searching for
prior art not only in the USTPO databases, but by interviewing
187. See Virginia L. Richands, Temporary Appointments to the Federal
Judiciary:Article 11 Judges?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 702, 702-05 (1985) (explaining
the federal judiciary appointment process).
188. See supra note 185 (discussing how judges with a patent background
are logically better suited to handle patent law related issues than those

without such training).
189. See Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 280 (1976) (holding that
"[tihe ultimate test of patent validity is one of law"); Avia Group Int'l., Inc. v.
L.A. Gear Cal., Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1562 (1988) (holding that patent "[vialidity
is a question of law").
190. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (describing "Inventions Patentable"); 35 U.S.C.
§ 102 (describing "[clonditions for patentability; novelty and loss of right to
patent"); 35 U.S.C. § 103 (describing "[c]onditions for patentability; nonobvious
subject matter").
191. See supra Part I.C (discussing the problems with business method
patents).
192. Razem, supra note 33, at 542-43 (noting the huge difficulty in finding
prior art for business method patents using the traditional prior art search
methods), Fehlner & Zager, supra note 33, at C4 col. 4 (explaining that there
is a "dearth of business-method patent prior art available").
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experts in the field of the art (e.g., M.B.A.s, scientists, etc.),
attempting to gain access to "private collections of industry
memorabilia,"'93 and researching other non-traditional avenues for
prior art.
5.

When the PV-Court Can Hear a Validity Dispute

A procedure will be enacted to determine when the PV-Court
can hear a dispute regarding a business method patent's
validity."
To avoid having the PV-Court's docket overrun by
having to determine the validity of every business method patent
issued, only certain situations will enable one to have the PVCourt determine the validity of the business method patent. 9'
First, the PV-Court will decide the issue of a business method
patent's validity if it is at issue in a pending lawsuit filed in a
district court. Because all patents are presumed valid,'96 if a party
takes on the burden of attempting to prove otherwise,'97 the issue
of validity alone will automatically be heard by the PV-Court
which will issue a finding. The finding will be final and binding
unless appealed."9
A second situation which will enable the PV-Court to make a
determination as to the validity of a business method patent is if a
party receives a letter from a business method patentee requiring
the party to stop using the method or pay a licensing fee. The
party that receives the letter can file the letter with the PV-Court
and request that it make a decision as to the validity of the
business method patent.
6.

The Processfor Making a Validity Determination
After the PAIs conclude their investigation, they will provide

193. See Razem, supra note 33, at 541 (explaining that one reason why
business method patent prior art is difficult to find is that much of it is located
in private collections).
194. See Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S.
826, 827-32 (2002) (explaining the federal courts' limited jurisdiction to hear
cases).
195. See Lemley, supra note 66, at 1497, 1511 (discussing the overburdening
of patent examiners). Before a patent's validity can be determined, its claims
must be construed. Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d
1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001). However, Lemley concludes that to make a full
validity determination before issuing a patent, say by having the examiner
spend an extra thousand hours examining it, would be "ludicrous and
unworkable" since the validity of most issued patents is never challenged.
Lemley, supra note 66, at 1497, 1511.
196. See Lear, 395 U.S. at 670 (stating that all issued United States patents
are presumed to be valid); 35 U.S.C. § 282 (requiring a presumption of validity

with every issued patent).
197. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (explaining the burden of establishing that the
patent is invalid).
198. See infra Part IV.A.6 (explaining the appeal procedure).
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the PV-Judge with an analysis of their findings and a
recommendation as to whether that which is patented as a
business method exists as prior art.
The PV-Judge will conduct the Markman hearing' and will
review the documents submitted to her by the PAIs and any
relevant briefs submitted by the parties. The PV-Judge will
request any testimony or additional information that the PVJudge determines is necessary to decide the issue of validity. The
PV-Judge will then make the decision of validity based on the
parties' briefs, the independent investigation conducted by the
PAI's, testimony, relevant statutes, and existing case law.Y After
making her decision, the PV-Judge will issue a ruling on the sole
issue of the business method patent's validity.
7.

The Processfor Reviewing a Validity Determination

In the event that a party feels that the PV-Judge's
determination is erroneous, and can back that opinion by evidence
in the record, the party may appeal the finding. In such an event,
the finding will be appealed to the Federal Circuit that will review
the decision using a clearly erroneous standard, as opposed to a de
novo review. Any further appeal would go to the United States
Supreme Court, whose choice whether to review is discretionary.
B. The Advantages and PotentialProblems with the PV-Court
The PV-Court provides many benefits over the current way
that a business method patent's validity is determined. First, it
frees up the current federal district court system's docket by
moving validity determinations over to a separate court system.0 1
As a result, decisions regarding the validity of a business method
patent at the PV-Court level will be resolved quicker than under
the current system. Furthermore, on appeal, because of the
clearly erroneous standard of review, the process should also be
accelerated.
Under the current system, if a business method patent is
invalid, the parties will not know that for many months or even
years because of the current docket-backlog at the district court
level.21 Under the PV-Court system the parties will know sooner
as to whether the plaintiffs claim of infringement may have
199. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 372-91 (discussing the judge's role in a
Markman hearing).
200. See Thomas G. Field III, The Role of Stare Decisis in the Federal Circuit,
9 FED. CIR. B.J. 203, 203-09 (1999) (discussing stare decisis in the Federal
Circuit).
201. See Nickels & Simmons, supra note 74 (noting that many of the federal
district courts suffer from tremendous backlogs in their dockets).
202. See id. (illustrating the extent of docket backlog by providing statistics
and the median times for a dispute to go from filing to disposition).
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merit."°' If the business method patent is determined to be invalid,
the allegedly infringing party can use the method and the public
can continue to be benefited by it.2" If, on the other hand, the
business method patent is deemed to be valid, the patentee can
maintain or initiate a suit against the alleged infringing party, or
the parties can discuss settlement while avoiding the current
problem of opportunistic business method patent licensing.0 5
Another significant advantage to the PV-Court over the
current system is that validity of the patent is determined by those
who are experts in the highly technical area of patent law."° As
opposed to the validity of the patent being determined by a federal
district court that is capable of hearing many different kinds of
civil and criminal claims, validity is instead determined by a
specialized court having a significant level of expertise in the area
of patent law. 07
The small defendant is also directly benefited by the PVCourt because part of the discovery work, at least as it relates to
prior art of the business method patent, is also investigated by the
PAIs. Thus, this takes away some of the financial burden that
often accompanies the small defendant in having to do discovery,
which then forces them to pay a licensing fee despite the fact that
the business method patent may be invalid.2" Because the PAls
are not acting as adversaries, but rather as independent
investigators, the small defendant that is unable to afford the cost
of discovery
is likely to be damaged less than under the current
9
system.

The small defendant is also benefited by the PV-Court
because it is able to have the validity of the patent decided after
receiving a letter from the business method patentee to either stop
using the method or to pay a licensing fee. Because validity of the
business method patent is the only issue being decided, and
because PAls incur much of the discovery cost, the small
defendant can seek out the PV-Court to make a determination on
validity and avoid being forced into paying the licensing fee for
203. See Roberts, supra note 29, at 74 (noting the merits of a patent claim).
204. See Lemley, supra note 66, at 1515-17 (noting the social costs of bad
patents); Lear, 395 U.S. at 663-64 (explaining how competition should not be
frustrated due to bad patents).
205. See Vermont, supra note 8, at 328, 360 n.2 (indicating that many
defendants choose to settle in order to avoid the high cost of patent litigation).
206. See supra note 185 (discussing how judges with a patent background
are logically better suited to handle patent law related issues than those

without such training).
207. Id.
208. See Meurer, supra note 61, at 530-31 (explaining the significant
expense involved in the discovery process).
209. See Vermont, supra note 8, at 360 n.2 (noting the high cost of discovery

for defendants in patent litigation).

20041

OpportunisticBusiness Method PatentLicensing

fear of litigation expense without first knowing the validity of the
business method patent.
The public would also benefit from the PV-Court. Under the
current system, the growth of industry and entrepreneurialism are
stunted when business method patentees engage in opportunistic
business method patent licensing.210 Under the new system, the
PV-Court restores confidence in the patent system and protects
the public from bad business method patents by having the highly
specialized area of law regarding patent validity determined by
experts in the field in less time and for less money than under the
current system.
Although the PV-Court provides many benefits, there is also a
potential problem: the cost of implementing such a system.
Perhaps funding could be raised by increasing the patent filing fee,
which could generate significant revenues. 211
Despite the many benefits to the PV-Court, it would be silly to
suggest that in one swoop it is guaranteed to fix the highly
complicated problem involving opportunistic business method
patent licensing.212 Instead, new solutions must oftentimes be
tweaked and massaged in order to achieve the desired level of
functionality.2 3 Thus, the PV-Court serves as a proposed solution;
it serves as a workable start to addressing the serious problem in
which it is intended to solve.
V.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Don't you know I'm still standing better than I ever did
Looking like a true survivor, feeling like a little kid
I'm still standing after all this time
Picking up the pieces of my life without you on my mind.2
Small defendants currently face being put out of business due
in part to large patentees asserting that the small defendants are
infringing their business method patents.
However, many
business method patents would be found invalid by a court if
litigation was allowed to proceed to that point. The problem is
that under the current system, the small defendant is unable to
get to a validity determination due to the high cost of patent
litigation. Thus, many small defendants pay the licensing fee,
210. See Lear, 395 U.S. at 663-64 (explaining that bad patents should not be
allowed to stunt competition). See supra Part II.B (explaining the damage
caused to the public due to opportunistic business method patent licensing).
211. See Benman, supra note 28 (detailing the significant growth in patent

application filings).
212. See Dragich, supra note 185, at 74 (explaining the long road of changes
in the federal court system).
213. See id.

214. Elton John, I'm Still Standing, on TOO Low FOR ZERO (MCA Records
2001).

1392

The John MarshallLaw Review

[37:1359

which
results in both the growth of industry and
entrepreneurialism to be stunted.
The new PV-Court provides a workable solution to the current
problem faced by small defendants. The system takes some of the
initial discovery costs off of the small defendants by allowing the
PAIs to investigate the prior art of the business method patent.
The issue of validity is decided faster than under the current
system, thus 'resulting in small defendants being able to continue
using the method claimed if the patent is found invalid. As a
result, industry and entrepreneurialism can flourish as bad
business method patents are appropriately weeded out of the
system. This will leave small defendants that use business
methods singing a happier tune.

